JINA Alliance
Freedom is indivisible.

As geopolitical tensions rise in Iran following Israeli and American strikes and calls for regime change increase, the global debate over Iran’s future has grown even more urgent and in some respects more divided, according to experts, journalists, and analysts. As we watched the bombing of Iran unfold in June 2025, Iranian eyes and ears were keen to perceive recognition of the Iranian people amidst the incessant Western (i.e., non-Iranian) media fanfare - there was none. Talking points streamed into reporters’ earpieces and pundits with endless “Breaking News” updates failed to mention Iran’s human capital, the Woman Life Freedom movement, the renaissance in Iran that followed, the toll of bombing on ordinary civilians in Iran, and Iranian calls for democracy and human rights. But what causes this gaping hole in covering the human cost, capital and cries of the Iranian people? How does this impact the next question that follows before regime change: where does the so-called “Iranian opposition” stand? 

As voices flood the already heated global debates about the Islamic Republic of Iran, censorship in Iran, the absence of unbiased media coverage, and the limited outreach to diverse voices, whether Iranians inside of Iran or Iranians within the diaspora, all contribute to a narrow understanding of the so-called “Iranian opposition.” 

Analysis of the so-called “Iranian opposition” has historically lacked complexity. This phenomenon is in large part due to limited awareness of families, histories, internal Iranian inflection points, daily conversations, anxieties, advocates, and the psychological strain of activism. There is insufficient engagement with activists behind the scenes, non-governmental professionals in Iran, the dozens of different ethnic and minority groups within Iran, the hundreds of diaspora-based non-profits and community groups amplifying calls for democracy in Iran, and a host of other factors. Without deeper awareness of what the Iranian opposition consists of at the grassroots and aspirational levels, outside analysts are forced to rely on only what they see. This limitation permits those with the loudest voices, deepest pockets and strongest personalities to appear as the only legitimate options to consider when it comes to a post-Islamic Republic Iran.

Typically, the media and Iran analysts focus more on the lack of alternatives to the current brutal regime, rather than dig deeper to unearth the latest embryonic developments of Iranian opposition. Take for instance, a recent piece analyzing this very issue. Tom O’Connor is Deputy Editor for National Security and Foreign Policy at Newsweek. His June 16, 2025 article titled, “As Israel Eyes Regime Change, Iran's Opposition Is Divisive and Divided,” explained the Iranian opposition in terms of a simple binary: Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and Maryam Rajavi, leader of the notorious Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), rebranded under several names, including the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and Organization of Iranian American Communities (OIAC).

On one hand, the MEK/NCRI is despised by the vast majority of Iranians inside and outside of Iran, and is often described as a cult by former members and human rights observers. Although the MEK/NCRI will never have serious prospects among Iranians, their undemocratic strict adherence systems result in an uncompromisingly dedicated and self-financed organization; this allows their strength and numbers to appear larger than they are. 

On the other hand, the pro-monarchy/pro-Reza Pahlavi contingency has at best 15-20% of the support of Iranians inside of Iran, according to many Iran watchers. Pro-Pahlavi monarchists, many of whom left Iran in the late 1970s, never returned and have relatively less family remaining in the country, are sometimes viewed by Iranians inside Iran as disconnected from Iran’s modern day population. Discourse with Iranians inside Iran suggests today’s population could be comprised of 15% and even up to 20% ideological supporters of the regime, who cannot be purged by death or exiled en masse should a democratic transition take shape. Moreover, Iran’s practicing Muslims, who may comprise up to 20% of the population, are wary of a monarchist opposition group, whose adherents have at times been known to tie Islam and the Islamic Republic together. In the past, the Reza Pahlavi coalition has been criticized as relying on Iranian nationalism and comparisons to how it is unlike the Islamic Republic, rather than a clear political roadmap and explanation for how to unite Iran’s many monarchy-wary ethnic minority groups, who themselves account for approximately 20% of the population.

Both of these options are spotlighted as potential alternatives to the Islamic Republic. However, something is missing from this narrative. The presence, and promise, of a third and crucial coalition: a pro-republic, secular democratic alliance that is neither beholden to the nostalgia of past glory, nor brainwashed by Islamist-communist ideology. Unlike either of these groups, a third coalition without a symbolic or actual leader can reflect the true diversity of Iran, based on a new wave of decentralized organizing rooted in democratic participation.  

Although quiet and nascent, a pro-republic coalition does exist, composed of multiple grassroots movements both within Iran and the diaspora, and includes civil society groups, former political prisoners, ordinary civilians, and political organizations. Rather than announce support for one individual leader, this coalition singularly keeps its focus on secular democracy, transparency, and methods of representing the many ethnic, religious, and diverse-minded individuals in Iran. This underlying framework stands in contrast to the more personality-driven models of the MEK and Reza Pahlavi opposition groups. 

By the same token, it makes the pro-republic coalition harder to identify and pinpoint, more difficult to perceive its advocacy, and ultimately, leaves it hampered by a lack of recognition. Importantly, building a democratic leaderless coalition from the ground up requires mutual trust, governing by consensus, and sharing power - attributes and tolerances that have been stifled by over forty years of trauma at the hands of the Islamic Republic. What this coalition needs is time, but asking for continued patience from the long-oppressed people of Iran comes with a sting of its own.

The pro-republic coalition does have something else in its favor, however. While MEK and monarchy supporters have aligned themselves with foreign powers, the pro-republic coalition is grounded in Iranian self-determination. It aims to be a coalition that resists the “trap” of foreign backing and emphasizes organic change created by Iranians themselves as the best alternative to the current regime. For example, the MEK's history of siding with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, combined with its other terrorist operations, has led to a lack of genuine support from Iranians. Likewise, Reza Pahlavi’s open alignment with Israel alienated large swaths of the Iranian public, especially as the June 2025 bombing of Iran unfolded. As O’Connor cites in his Newsweek article, nostalgia for the Shah may exist among a number of Iranians, but the support for a monarchy restoration, even the constitutional flavor, is not the majority opinion. 

Meanwhile, the idea of a democratic coalition has been gaining traction, not through publicity or lobbying, but through painstaking grassroots organizing, which is often hampered by power struggles, individual egos, the rise and fall of pro-republic groups, time and geographic differences, opposing perspectives on how “loud” to be against other opposition groups, and notably, a lack of long-term cultural and political consciousness that cements high tolerance for debate without anger. 

Overall, it is neither fair nor accurate to analyze Iran through the lens of only two opposition groups, especially when both of those options face serious impediments. A third option does exist that has the potential to be principled, inclusive, growing and arguably is the most similar to the fabric of a democratic society. But what it intends in vision is ironically undermined by a lack of a culturally and deeply instilled practice of democratic machinations by Iranians. Therein lies the rub - a missing middle of many outstretched hands that struggles to find itself within the fog.